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“[Q]uae sane unica fuisset causa, ut veritas humanum genus in aeternum lateret; 
nisi Mathesis...”
Spinoza, Ethics, Book I appendix
I. Taming of the infinite, taming of the void
On the 4th of June 1925, David Hilbert famously announced to the Westphalian 
Mathematical Congress that “No one shall drive us out of the paradise that Can-
tor has created for us.”1 For more than a century now we can comfortably speak 
of a “modern mathematics”, marked by the twin breakthroughs of Cantor and 
Dedekind  in the last years of the 19th century, through which infinite orders of 
infinity (the transfinite), along with the field of irrational numbers, have become 
the mundane operable entities of mathematical and philosophical work. With 
this “taming of the infinite”, can we also speak of a taming of the void? 
In earlier historical contexts, the void-infinite formed a conceptual pair. In some 
of the earliest conflicts between the partisans of the void and those against, we 
find Aristotle’s famous refutations of atomism. Typical among these rejections 
was Aristotle’s direct association of the void with the indefinite. As he argues 
in the Physics, any locomotive event implies definite speed of such motion and, 
since the void is itself indefinite, it could not provide a criterion of measure for 
such motion. In other words, if locomotion exists, then the void does not.”2 
The Antique indefinite is of course not the “infinite” understood, across the 
many transformations of the concepts from the medieval and modern periods, 
either as the absoluteness of god or the various mathematical distinctions made 
1 David Hilbert, “On the Infinite”, in Philosophy of Mathematics, 2nd ed., edited by Paul 
Benacerraf and Hilary Putnam, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983, p. 191.
2 Aristotle, Physics, IV 8, 215a5-12; The Basic Works of Aristotle, ed. Richard McKeon, New 
York: Modern Library, 2001, p. 283.
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on the infinite through these periods. At the same time however, it is this same, 
albeit ambiguous, indefinite-infinite that is irrevocably demystified with the ad-
vent of Cantor’s transfinite. Along with Cantor, Dedekind can also be given some 
share of the spotlight here. The very idea of an “irrational” number co-extensive 
with something as fundamental as the Pythagorean theorem entertains legends 
of the poor Hippasus who was apparently murdered (by drowning according to 
Pappus of Alexandria) by the master Pythagoras himself for making exoteric 
what was the irrational esoteric secret within the cult. With Dedekind, irration-
als come to share the same determinate status as any number whatsoever picked 
out from the “cut” of the continuous number line. Hence, if the irrational, infi-
nite (indefinite), and other such terms (i.e. imaginary-complex) are no longer 
the conceptual mirror of the void, we see that the void itself has also, in this, 
been demystified. The couple void-infinite (indefinite) can only be sustained if 
the indeterminateness of the former can be imputed on the latter. To make a 
long historical story very brief (bypassing the long entanglements with the infi-
nite across roughly two millennia), we are no longer in the position to conceive 
the infinite as indeterminate and thus equally denied the luxury of making this 
conceptual circuit between the infinite, indeterminate, and the void.  
With the taming of the infinite, the void is thus also tamed. From without and 
within, the void should neither be thought as the abiding negative principle 
from which a structure of particular things is un-determined nor should it be an 
undetermined abyss immanent in each determinate being from which transfor-
mation spring forth. The conceptual power of the void is neutralized along with 
that of the infinite. 
II. Atomistic Stratagem
Let us formulate this insight sketched above in the form of a critique of contem-
porary thought. As our reflections on the void and the infinite (in meta-mathe-
matical terms) above are at a certain remove from contemporary philosophy, we 
bracket these reflections for the moment. 
From thinkers as diverse as Rancière, Agamben, and Žižek, we find a common 
strategy for thinking with the void. These three represent at least three different 
traditions of thought, each one represented by some proper subset of Marxism, 
Heideggeriansm, deconstruction, psychoanalysis, and structuralism, and my 
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criticism against them cannot but remain far from addressing their larger con-
tributions. Yet it is perhaps due to the diversity in this spectrum of thinkers that 
their commonality on the question of the void might indeed be striking. This 
common strategy is no doubt familiar to readers of contemporary continental 
theory. It can be briefly sketched in four steps. This might be named the “atom-
istic strategy”.
[1] The first step is to outline some quasi-total structure, regime, or frame-
work of representation. This is to be identified as the political state (un-
derstood as the neo-liberal police-state, ideology, etc.), universal bio-po-
litical regime, global capitalism, or the like. 
[2] The second step is to assert the structural difficulties in undermin-
ing or resisting such a quasi-total structure or regime in the terms of the 
structure itself. As such, the dissenting demonstrations of a citizenry or 
the contestation of labour unions are quickly absorbed by the structural 
forces and set to reproduce the structures that provoked such acts. The 
problem is that these resisting forces of the structure are determinate 
(though antagonistic) features of the structure itself. In other words, there 
is no non-work time in capitalism, outside the 8 hours of labour, there are 
8 hours of rest and 8 hours of leisure (according to the famous slogan but 
now a tremendous luxury). Both rest and leisure are determinate parts of 
the 24 hour productive day. 
[3] The third step is to designate a singular abstract subject such as the 
proletariat, the commons, and the like, often allegorized in figures like 
Melville’s Bartleby, the ignorant school-master (J. Jacotot), the Tianan-
men protestors, or the Israeli Refusniks. These are singular figures insofar 
as their actions (or non-actions, not part of the circle labour-rest-leisure) 
have no valence within the coordinates of the quasi-total structure identi-
fied in point [1] and [2] above. These constitute a real challenge or danger 
to the given regime or structure, unlike those actions in point [2] above, 
precisely because they not only delegitimise such structures by render-
ing apparent the latter’s arbitrariness or contingency, their actions also 
constitute an existent yet non-determinate resistance or nascent counter-
power to the existent regime. 
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[4] The fourth and final step is to generalize the status of these singular 
subjects (or in-actions) in order to make a general point about the rela-
tion between a regime or structure and the void. By identifying the sin-
gular subject above [3] with the void, we allow ourselves to schematize 
this structure-regime (power-aesthetic-representation) by identifying a 
“hole”, “gap”, “lack”, or “blind-spot”.  Such figures of the void provide 
an “immanent-outside”, which, because they are at once part of the re-
gime and unrepresentable in the terms of said regime, allow us to delimit 
such a regime qua structure outside of the terms (the determinate identi-
ties) with which the regime itself operates. This figure of the void not only 
allows us to determine the contingent or arbitrary limits of any structure, 
it also allows us to determine the undetermined abyss via the figure of the 
singular subject that would be capable of undermining such seemingly 
impenetrable quasi-totalities as the police-state, bio-politics, and global 
capitalism. 
Though far from disagreeing with such a general strategy in the analysis of con-
temporary politics, it is with the last of these “steps” sketched above that our 
present critique takes exception. It concerns itself with how this singular inde-
terminate subject noted above [3] should be understood. We see in the above 
sketch that the problem of the singular is conceptualized within a context of two 
other terms: a determinate order of representations (regime, state, etc.) and a 
determinate order of transformations within the order (dissent, contestations, 
etc.). The problem of the determinate order of transformation is that such a form 
of difference is not strong enough or radical enough to uproot the ruling order 
but, through integration or reform, only to recombine the already given group of 
identities or representations. The third term, that of the void, serves to disrupt 
such “reformism” precisely insofar as it plays no part in the operation of “nor-
mal transformation” within the given structure. 
Here we might look at Ancient Atomism for the understanding of the strategy. 
We know that the Epicureans formulated a specific solution for a problem that 
arose in the attempt to account for being in terms of the twin principles of void 
and atom. The problem, posed in opposition to Aristotle, arose in the context of 
the genesis of physical reality. If all atoms (the indivisibles) fell in the void with 
the same speed, what would result in such a “rain” would be tantamount to be-
ing no reality at all insofar as it would lack in even minimal differentiability. At 
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least in Lucretius, a “swerve”, “declination”, or clinamen is necessary in “the 
first beginnings” in order to generate the eventual aggregations and interactions 
that will generate the physical world of differentiated things and forms.3 As 
such, the determinate system of atomic interactions requires a principle of in-
determination precisely because what is determinate can only be grasped from 
within the physical system itself. The origin of such a system would by defini-
tion be indeterminate, as Lucretius puts it, “at no fixed place and at no fixed 
time.” It is in this sense that the final step of the four-step strategy described 
above is nicely illustrated by Epicurean atomism. The contemporary “atomis-
tic strategy” identifies the void (qua indeterminate principle) and the clinamen. 
Such an approach to the indeterminate, found not only in the Epicurean school 
but also in the contemporary “atomistic strategy”, suffer from a form of ersatz 
reification of that “something” required by the lacking “ground” for a desidera-
tum of systematic consistency. We see here that the solution to the Atomistic 
problem can only take the form of a hypostasis, the reification of an indeter-
minate clinamen. If such an origin could be determinate, it would already have 
to be part of the physical system and hence we would require another, more 
original indeterminate principle (in a regressive account ad infinitum). In the 
contemporary context, it is the void that plays such a role as the reified reposi-
tory for the indeterminate. 
In philosophical terms, this way of thinking the “indeterminate” qua void is 
such that it renders it dependent on its relation with the determinate. As a fig-
ure of “abyss”, “lack”, or “hole”, the signification of the void is coextensive 
with that for which it is “other”; dependent on the determinate, the total, the 
whole. It is here that the meta-mathematical reflection from which we started 
can provide some insight. In purely figurative terms, it is only within the as-
sumption of a quasi-totalizing regime-structure-state that this conceptual con-
nection between the void qua singular and the indeterminate-indefinite-infinite 
can constitute a circuit of terms. It is this very circuit between a global or uni-
versal state-regime of representations, its normal transformations of particular 
transformations-recombination, and the radical or singular void, that is the aim 
of this four-step program outlined above shared by a surprisingly divergent set 
3 Lucretius, De Rerum Natura, II 290-293; On the Nature of Things, trans. by W.H.D. Rouse 
and rev. by Martin F. Smith, Cambridge, MA: Loeb Classical Library, 2002, p. 119. 
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of contemporary philosophical tendencies. By rejecting the identification of the 
void with the indeterminate, it is also this very circuit that must be rejected. 
Although implicit, this circuit of terms sketched above makes use of the identi-
fication of the void and the infinite qua indefinite-indeterminate. If, as we have 
argued, this couple void-infinite is no longer a viable one, how can we recon-
ceive the singular? In other words, how can we conceive of the singular indeter-
minate outside of its subsumption within the co-extensiveness of the void and 
totality? What is at stake here is a different possible conception of the singular 
in the confrontation between philosophy and those singular figures at work in 
our time out of joint. 
 
III. Zero divides into two
Badiou’s long philosophical development, from his early interventions within 
the Althusserian-Lacanian journal Cahiers pour l’analyse in the late 1960s to his 
recent multi-volumed Being and Event, provides an alternative path to the “At-
omistic strategy”: call it a “formalist” alternative.4 This approach, which draws 
from the actuality of a post-Cantorian meta-mathematical universe, commences 
from the key insight that the taming of the infinite entails a neutralization of the 
void. In order to isolate the key difference that this approach makes and to estab-
lish a paradigm for understanding this formalist alternative, we shall examine 
the theoretical conflict between Badiou and Miller, his colleague-interlocutor 
in his early essays in the Cahiers. It is in the context of the Cahiers that one can 
also glimpse a red thread of contention that will prefigure the many polemical 
episodes that will mark Badiou’s work since the 1960s.  
To grasp the context of Badiou’s refutation of Miller, we must make a short de-
tour into the problem of structuralism, which provides not only the background 
for Badiou’s philosophical formation but also that of the speculative zero-de-
gree for many participants of the Cahiers. From the work of Saussure, an answer 
is given to the question of how meaning is constituted in language through the 
internal organization of textual or phonemic signs. Against an essentialist ac-
count of how marks or sounds produce meaning, an alternative account is pro-
vided whereby sense arises out of the contingent distribution of semantic values 
4 The Cahiers pour l’analyse will be abbreviated as Cahiers in what follows. 
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over a series of mutually distinguished signs. This functional account of sense or 
meaning then relies on the consistency of structure understood as a closed set 
of mutually distinguished variable-places over which values can be assigned. 
In turn, these variable-places, before any distribution of values over them, are 
neutral or without sense. 
Such a structuralist account may serve the analysis of any given natural lan-
guage, but it faces concrete limits in the investigation of the origins of the emer-
gence of the series of signifying marks (textual or phonemic) themselves. In 
the later adaptation of the structuralist turn in the field of anthropology, Lévi-
Strauss was clear to abstain from genetic accounts in his functional analysis 
of morphisms in kinship and mythic structure. On the question of genetic ac-
counts, like Laplace before Napoleon, Levi-Strass notes that, “[I] shall now do 
no more than repeat that social anthropology has no need of this hypothesis.”5 
Through long discussions with one of the most important mathematicians of 
the 20th century, André Weil, Lévi-Strauss borrowed heavily from the algebra 
structure of groups (group theory) in order to provide the dimension of a “neu-
tral” or “identity” operator responsible for sustaining the internal consistency 
of anthropological structure.6 This algebraic influence allowed Lévi-Strauss to 
make a further steps toward a functional analysis (whose contingency was al-
ways foundational) of the nature of social arrangements and myths precisely by 
delimiting structural analysis from a non-structural origin or genesis. Far from 
implying that there is no genesis of structure (linguistic, anthropological), the 
idea is that there can be no account of such a genesis from the structure itself. 
Here the tools of analysis require a field of determinate terms, and the indeter-
minate genesis of such a determinate structure is by definition outside of the 
field of analysis. 
In full view of this problem of genesis in structuralism, both Lacan’s “Science 
and Truth” and Miller’s “Suture (Elements of the logic of the signifier)”, their 
respective contributions to the inaugural volume (February 1966) of the Cahiers, 
provide attempts to treat this limit of causality of structure while preserving a 
5 Claude Lévi-Strauss, The Elementary Structure of Kinship, trans. by J.H. Bell, John Richard 
von Stumer and ed. by Rodney Needham, Boston: Beacon Press, 1969, p. xxix.  
6 Cf. André Weil, “On the Algebraic Study of Certain Types of Marriage Laws (Murngin sys-
tem)”, in The Elementary Structure of Kinship, p. 221-230.
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structuralist background framework.7 In these texts, both Miller and Lacan pro-
vide a dynamic view of structure by reconceiving the problem of the causality of 
structure. Since genetic causality cannot be given within structure, this causal-
ity must be treated as the indeterminate “other” of the structure (understood 
in the structuralist framework as a closed system of mutually differentiated 
variable-places). Both Lacan and Miller provide a sophisticated handling of this 
problem. Although we have been speaking in a figuratively chronological way 
about genetic causality, both Lacan and Miller understand such a limit to struc-
tural analysis in a transcendental way. That is, the problem of causality need 
not be chronologically prior to structure, what is simply indicated is that, inso-
far as structure is limited by the contingent grounds of its internal consistency, 
one can retroactively or immanently attend to such an internal indetermination 
within a given structure. 
This starts to look a lot like the “Atomistic strategy” above. Since the origin of 
physical interaction following the physical rules of “weight” and “trajectory” 
has an origin that cannot be accounted for within physics, an exception must be 
conjectured. This exception, understood in the Atomistic framework as the cli-
namen or “swerve”, is the errant, contingent, and undetermined transformation 
that causally generates this closed structure of mutual effect at some indetermi-
nate and retroactively posited origin. 
Miller’s important contribution to this historical line of conceptual construc-
tions is in his explicit connection of such a structuralist problem and the prob-
lem of mathematical consistency. From the outset we see that the development 
of structuralism has followed in the path of mathematical formalization not the 
least with Levi-Strauss’ early use of group theory, a tendency he will continue 
to exploit into the fields of topology in following works. Here, Miller seems to 
take the tendency to its extreme: the structural reading of Frege’s Foundations 
of Arithmetic. But Miller was not only following an intellectual tendency but, as 
we shall see, developing the fundamental problem of the contingency in struc-
turalism by the identification of the same problem within the Grundlagenkrise 
in mathematics.
7 All references to the Cahiers pour l’analyse are taken from the website of the project where 
original texts and a number of translations are available. <cahiers.kingston.ac.uk>.
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Miller’s structuralist approach to Frege addresses the problem of the analytic 
nature of the field of arithmetic entities. Much like the problem of structure, the 
entities of arithmetic provided Miller with the occasional cause to coordinate 
the problem of the indeterminate in structure with mathematics. This attempt 
was part of Miller’s project of producing a “logic of the signifier” and constituted 
one of the key intended aims of the Cahiers project. Frege’s aim was to move the 
foundations of arithmetic (and mathematics in general) away from the vicious 
circularity that had shrouded the transcendental character of mathematical 
foundations in the Kantian tradition which had been widely influential since 
the 18th century. Kant’s definition of the foundations of arithmetic, put forward 
in the Critique of Pure Reason and in the Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphys-
ics, attached counting, and, in turn, the successive iteration of numbers, to the 
intuition of time, the form of inner sense. 8 Arithmetic was then an a priori cogni-
tion based on the synthesis of units of time which might be reduced to a feature 
of consciousness: the intuitive self-representation of a unit of time, a moment. 
This approach relies on a pre-given notion of unity, a unit of time, pre-given in 
the cognitive faculty itself. What this implies is the synthetic nature of arithme-
tic: the combination of these represented units supplied by inner cognition. Yet 
we seem to be caught in a petitio principia. Arithmetic ends up being grounded 
by something that is already arithmetical. This is no grounding at all.9 
The question of mathematical Grundlagenkrise was how to present a theory of 
arithmetic without already presupposing numerical concepts. Against the in-
vocation of the “unit” in consciousness, Frege put emphasis on the idea that a 
certain sort of numericity was already operative in primitive logical relations. 
When we distinguish things by reference, a certain “number” of them are im-
plicit in such a referentiality. A concept that picks out “featherless bipeds” 
already implies a certain number of these objects, its extension. Yet, in order 
to bridge this implicit feature of logic with an explicit and unique reference to 
numbers themselves, Frege has to first establish a univocal arithmetic series. In 
8 Cf. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Werner Pluhar, Indianapolis: Hackett 
Publishing, 1996, B 14-17, p. 55-57. 
9 Of course, there remained great mathematicians who attempted to re-articulate a “Kan-
tian” approach to the foundations of mathematics. The Neo-intuitionists, headed by L.E.J 
Brouwer, developed an alternative not only to a Fregean-Russelian (logicist) approach in 
the domain of foundations, but also an alternative to set-theoretical analysis of the con-
tinuum. Nonetheless, this development was made in view of these historical reconfigura-
tions of the standards and methods made standard in the wake of “modern mathematics”. 
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order to do this, one needs to find a unique reference to the number “zero” as 
the first number. Instead of “featherless bipeds”, the concept that Frege chose 
to express this was that which is “not identical with itself”.10 Frege, by reason-
ing that there is nothing that is not identical with itself, “x≠x”, identifies a con-
cept with no extension at all, since it does not refer to anything. In turn, with 
this unique referent in place, numbers would succeed as the re-counting of this 
empty referent. 
Concept Extension of the concept Natural (counting) 
number
Not identical with itself 
(x≠x)
∅ 0
Identical with ∅ {∅} 1
Identical with ∅, {∅} {∅,{∅}} 2




Unequivocal reference to the basic natural or counting numbers (0, 1, 2, 3,…) 
would proceed by reference to this concept. “One” would be the counting of 
this empty extension, “two” would be the counting of this counted empty exten-
sion, and “three” would be the counting of the counting of this empty set. This 
iterative procedure indeed returns to satisfy the iterative or successive structure 
of arithmetic progression. Once in place, the expansion of this basic procedure 
would allow us to map the successive, or iterative structure, generating the vari-
ety of other numbers (i.e. the evens, the rationals, the reals).11
10 Gottlob Frege, The Foundations of Arithmetic, trans. by J.L. Austin, New York: Harper 
Torchbooks, 1960,p.  88. Frege duly notes that, “I could have used for the definition of 
nought any other concept under which no object falls. But I have made a point of choosing 
one which can be proved to be such on purely logical grounds; and for this purpose ‘not 
identical with itself’ is the most convenient….” 
11  Of course the structure of these numbers (natural, evens, rationals, primes) qua numbers 
is not the same. It provides a mapping and the basic iterative structure allows a minimal 
means to mark differences at the same time as showing a bijective function (isomorphism). 
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Natural 0 1 2 3 4 5 …
Even 0 2 4 6 8 10 …
Prime 2 3 5 7 11 13 …
Frege’s foundational account for numbers requires a univocal reference to 
each number. Despite the fact that “featherless bipeds” and “words in this sen-
tence” pick out referents that display a certain numericity, what is necessary 
for a foundational account is to distinguish a unique referent, such as a zero, 
a one, a two, and so forth. These references could then allow us to place the 
extension (“picked out” entities) of these different concepts in correspondence 
with this numerical ordering. The number of words in this sentence (the exten-
sion of “the number of words in this sentence”) could thus refer uniquely to 
one of the numbers generated by this sequence of counting and recounting of 
the void set. The number is “38”. 
Miller’s interpretation of Frege hinges on the artful minimalism of Frege’s foun-
dational argument. On the one hand, Frege’s recognition of variation and ex-
tensive multiplicity in successful reference forced him to provide a unique refer-
ential scheme of numbers. On the other hand, this scheme carefully avoids the 
dangerous circularity of placing unity at its basis. It is through Frege’s minimal-
ism that Miller applies his notion of suture and brings together the content of 
Frege’s grounding concept and the structural lack in his project for a logic of the 
signifier. Miller underlines that Frege’s concept, “not identical with itself”, only 
picks out an empty set when the assumption that all things are actually identi-
cal with themselves is in place. This assumes a determination about the world 
that is not actually accounted for within Frege’s own system. This self-identity 
need not be ontologically basic. In turn, Miller underlines a certain exclusion of 
the non-identical as the creation, within a consistent system, of the twin poles 
of subject and object. He notes that, 
the impossible object, which the discourse of logic summons as the not-identical 
with itself and then rejects as the pure negative, which it summons and rejects in 
order to constitute itself as that which it is, which it summons and rejects wanting 
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to know nothing of it, we name this object, in so far as it functions as the excess 
which operates in the series of numbers, the subject.12 
In Miller’s reading, a lack constitutes structure and guarantees the system of 
identities that, in being identical with itself, can be minimally differentiated 
within an immanent series of differences. At the same time, the circulation of 
this lack, the impossible object (x ∅ x), which is summoned and then rejected, 
is afforded the place of a mark ∅, the null-zero that circulates in the structure. 
The impossible object, marked as zero, produces the declination of positions in 
arithmetic succession, it constitutes the object, the zero, and the successive iter-
ations made possible by this object, guaranteed by successful and unique refer-
ence. For Miller, this object would also be the subject, the excess of the structure, 
whose very content, “not identical with itself”, calls upon a suture that extra-
structurally correlates subject and structure (through the impossible object). In 
philosophical terminology we could understand this suture as the demonstra-
tion of the transcendental conditions of the consistency of the system. The inex-
haustible variation of subjective apperception is more extensive and varied than 
what is schematized in a realm of organized and immanently consistent differen-
tiations. This splitting of the transcendentally constituted knowing subject and 
the subject that underlies the transcendental determination itself is what deter-
mines the place of the subject. Miller’s suture introduces a distinction wherein 
both sides of this determination can be grasped by a more general logic of the 
signifier. Suture distinguishes the active creation of the objective qua systematic 
consistency from inconsistency by means of exclusion, or repression. In this con-
text, analysis is thus precisely what draws out repressed content. In this sense, 
Miller correlates the structural framework of psychoanalysis with the task of an 
epistemology of mathematics as the basis for a project for the logic of the signifier. 
There are many reasons to criticize and remain sceptical of Miller’s analysis of 
Frege, but there is no doubt that his use of Frege here is clear in outlining what 
his concept of suture is meant to do. In the most general terms, a consistent 
structure is constituted by repressing or excluding some impossible, inconsist-
ent, object, which provides the grounds for a series of differential identities or 
variable-places as well as animates the repetition and iterative succession of 
12 Jacques-Alain Miller, “Suture (Elements of the logic of the signifier)”, in Cahiers 
pour l’analyse, Vol. 1, Feb. 1966, trans. Jacqueline Rose, <cahiers.kingston.ac.uk/pdf/
cpa1.3.miller.translation.pdf>.
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these mutually differentiated terms. The methodology prescribed by the con-
cept of suture urges us to analyse this disavowed object (i.e. x≠x  inconsistency) 
and thus gain clarity into the operation of the structure and its necessary limits. 
In this, a Freudian “repetition” continually covers over the repressed or impos-
sible content of iteration. Over the course of the Cahiers, Miller and the members 
of the Cercle d’Épistémologie (the Althusserian students who formed the core 
editorial group the Cahiers) would take this general schema to the analysis of a 
variety of repetition themes from psychoanalysis, philosophy (and its history), 
to anthropology, literary theory, and political theory.
Badiou’s critique of Miller is presented in the 10th and final volume (1969) of the 
Cahiers, entitled “Mark and lack: on zero”.13 This work provides a resumé of a 
series of ideas that would eventually constitute Badiou’s early project of a “ma-
terialist epistemology” more fully developed in the Concept of Model, published 
in the same year.14 While it is aimed at a critique of the more Millerian tenden-
cies in the Cahiers, Badiou in fact sets down key elements from which we can 
glimpse some characteristic features of his later thought. I shall leave these later 
developments aside to concentrate on his critique of Miller. 
Badiou’s central critique strikes Miller’s text at its central point. Badiou con-
tests that Frege’s use of the non-identical (x≠x ) does not in any sense produce a 
“lack” and, in turn, there is nothing to suture. Badiou argues that the marks that 
enter into scientific practice such as formal logic or mathematics are generated 
without any repression of a fundamental lack. Badiou demonstrates this by his 
alternative account of the problem of structure in mathematics. 
Badiou begins by distinguishing three “mechanisms” of the structure and even-
tually adding a fourth. I present all four together here.15
13 Alain Badiou, “Mark and lack: on zero”, in Cahiers pour l’analyse, Vol. 10, Winter 1969, 
trans. Zachary Luke Fraser with Ray Brassier, < cahiers.kingston.ac.uk/pdf/cpa10.8.badiou.
translation.pdf>.
14 Cf. Alain Badiou, Le concept de Modèle, Paris: François Maspero, 1969; The Concept of 
Model, trans. and ed. by Z.L. Fraser and Tzuchien Tho, Melbourne: re.Press, 2007.   
15 Badiou, “Mark and lack: on zero”, pp. 2-5.
FV_02_2013.indd   39 15. 12. 13   18:38
40
tzuchien tho
[1] Mechanism 1 (M1), concatenation: Badiou assigns a first level to sign 
production: an indefinite number of (chains of) mutually differentiable 
marks.
[2] Mechanism 2 (M2), syntax: At a second level, he highlights the putting 
into place of syntactic rules which distinguishes well-formed and nonsensi-
cal expressions. In other words, at the M2 level, arbitrary marks are formed 
into expressions and the mechanism makes a distinction between well- 
and ill- formed syntactic expressions according to any number of rules. 
[3] Mechanism 3 (M3), derivation: At the third level, a mechanism of in-
ference-making allows us to distinguish which among the well-formed 
expressions are derivable and which ones are not. Of course, there are 
many well-formed expressions that are not derivable. In this M3 “picks 
out” a subset from the number of well-formed expressions distinguished 
by M2. The derivable are called “theorems” and the un-derivable are non-
theorems of the system. 
[4] Mechanism 4 (M4): With the distinction between theorems and non-
theorems, we can distinguish a fourth level, or a systematic level, which 
operates on the three previous levels to designate the structure, acting on 
the models constituted from M1 to M3, such as Zermelo-Frankel axiomatic 
set theory or any such theory (an indefinite number of such theories). 
This M4 level would also be the place where Frege’s arithmetic would oth-
erwise be found, if it were not for Russell’s famous and ruining critique of 
Frege’s model of arithmetic, building on the latter’s contradiction in the 
logic of predication (“a set of all sets”). In a footnote, Badiou underlines 
that this contradiction in Frege, pointed out by Russell in a 1901 letter, 
is internal to Frege’s own system and independent of Miller’s notion of 
repressed inconsistency. 16
With these four mechanisms in place (M1, M2, M3, M4), Badiou explains that what 
Miller clumsy attempt to articulate was a treatment at the level of system (M4) 
of something that is obviated at the level of derivation (M3), that is, the fact that 
non-identity is non-derivable. Badiou reasons that, 
16 Ibid., p. 9.
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for the inscription ~I(x,x) [ie. x≠x] does not occupy the place of anything else; nor 
does it mark the place of a nothing. As for the zero […] [i]t is positively constructed 
by M2. […] The zero is simply an inscription accepted by M2 and introduced, along 
with certain directions for use in M4. […] The zero marks in M4 (in predicative 
form) not the lack of a term satisfying a relation but rather a relation lacking in M3, 
it is only insofar as it figures in M2.17
 
In other words, logical contradiction is an effect of the structure and not its 
repressed content. Yet, as Badiou carefully points out, non-identity is a well-
formed expression (x≠x) and can be found in the previous stage (M2). Indeed, 
the process of derivation draws its material precisely from the number of well-
formed expressions that were first produced at M2, a mechanism that in turn 
draws its material from the series of mutually differentiated marks produced in 
M1. In turn, Russell’s problem with Frege has little to do with the “zero” and, if 
we temporary overlook Frege’s failure and treat it, as Miller does, as a consist-
ent system, its consistency is not in the least sense guaranteed by a lack or the 
marking of the lack. Russell’s problem concerns the scheme of predication and 
this issue of “inconsistency” is not that of the self-identity of marks in math-
ematical syntax. 
In pointing out this misdirection in the critique of mathematical structure in 
Miller’s work, Badiou forcefully generalizes his point: 
Accordingly, there is no subject of science. Infinitely stratified, regulating its pas-
sages, science is pure space, without inverse or mark or place of what it excludes. 
It is a foreclosure, but a foreclosure of nothing, and so can be called a psychosis 
of no subject, and therefore of all: universal by full right, a shared delirium, it is 
enough to hold oneself within it to no longer be anyone, anonymously dispersed 
in the hierarchy of orders. Science is the Outside without a blind spot.18 
To fully analyse such a bold declaration would take us too far afield. We should 
simply underline that Badiou’s exclusion of the subject in science, one that is 
exemplified in mathematical logic in the context of this article, entertains no 
concept of suture. As he argued earlier in the same article, “The logico-math-
17 Ibid., p. 10.
18 Ibid., p. 11.
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ematical signifier is sutured only to itself.”19 This is indeed no suture at all. In 
this, while remaining clear that there is no subject-structure suture in science, 
Badiou partially agrees with Miller that it is in the context of the analysis of 
ideology that the analytic tool of suture can do its work. From this, there is no 
question that, at the level of scientific (mathematical) systems, an ideological 
treatment of science can no doubt take hold. Badiou will once again address this 
problem in the Concept of Model in the same manner that he addressed Miller, 
from a bottom-up concept of model that would disavow its ideological appro-
priation on the basis of model logic qua science.  
This bottom-up approach to grasping mathematical or scientific reason through 
the “materiality of the signifier” places the opposition not between consistency 
and its necessarily excluded inconsistency but rather between two tendencies 
in treating the structural role of indetermination. The first tendency submits the 
scientific production of signs to a pre-given array of oppositions. Here, just as 
the consistency of a (physical) object is determined by its coordinates within 
space-time, an algebraic expression or a logical proposition occurs within its 
own logical space. However, especially in mathematics, scientific production 
constantly expands beyond its logical space. Rather than the attempt to secure 
this logical space, the second tendency understands scientific rationality pre-
cisely as the constant determination of new spaces of inscription. This is argued 
in another text of the same period of the 60s, the “Infinitesimal subversion”, 
published in the ninth issue (1968) of the Cahiers. Here we should only high-
light that Badiou argues that the supposed “irrationality” of infinite and infini-
tesimal, attested to in the history of the philosophical critique from Berkeley to 
Hegel and even Cantor and Fraenkel, of the infinitesimal calculus is made only 
on behalf of an idealized consistent “whole” of the unity of mathematics.20 The 
whole drama of the epistemological obstacle of “infinity” only holds in taking 
too seriously this tendency of treating mathematics as a consistent whole. That 
is, it is only against the background of a commitment to finitude that the infinite 
appears subversive.
19 Ibid., p. 6.
20 Alain Badiou, “Infinitesimal Subversion”, in Cahiers pour l’analyse, Vol. 9, Summer 1968, 
trans. Robin Mackay with Ray Brassier, < cahiers.kingston.ac.uk/pdf/cpa9.8.badiou.trans-
lation.pdf>.
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Let us then approach the positive stakes to be drawn from this refutation of 
Miller. When we reject the strategy of identifying the singular indeterminate as 
the contingent and excluded-included inconsistency of a given system, what re-
mains of the indeterminate? The alternative that Badiou’s early works provide is 
to see that the emergence of an “excluded”, or obstacle, can only appear when 
the subversive terms have already been produced. Against the Millerian path or 
suture, and by extension, the “atomist path”, we must reject the framework in 
which the break from a given structure is not the result of some repressed lack 
in the structure. In this, the “subversion” of the infinitesimal lies not in its en-
gendering of an “irrationality” against some contrasted background structure of 
rationality. Science operates rather in the neutralization of this very opposition 
through the positive recasting of allegedly “impossible” spaces as new inscrip-
tions. As such, it is in following through with the materiality of formalization 
and inscription, the literal production of marks, spaces, punctuation, and the 
like, that the “impossible” is demystified and drawn away from their subser-
vience, as Badiou puts it, “to those constraining illusions whose salvation re-
quired an ideal guarantee.”21  
The strongest case that Badiou puts forth for this is Gödel’s incompleteness 
proof. Given the four mechanisms that Badiou argues above, Gödel’s proof 
amounts to a well-formed expression (M2), say expression g, for which g is not a 
theorem but the negation of g is not a theorem either. The undecidable expres-
sion g is of course not a theorem (M3), but systematically determines (M4) what 
is indetermined within the system, a limit defined by the positive production of 
the system itself. As such it has nothing to do with either the suture or the place 
of the void as the point of suture. As Badiou argues, Gödel’s incompleteness 
establishes, immanent within the system, a gap unmoored by the distinctions 
within the structure. This gap is precisely a singular and indeterminate expres-
sion constituted by the system but assignable within the system. 
In philosophical terms, Badiou provides a notion of the indeterminate singular 
that does not rely on a meta-systematic suture. That is, it does not rely on a hy-
postasized extra-systematic circuit already presumed about the indeterminate 
and the determinate in order to account for the dynamics of the structure either 
conceived as iterative or otherwise.   
21 Alain Badiou, “Infinitesimal Subversion”, p. 16. 
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IV. Singular and indeterminate but not inconsistent
In retrospect it might be easy to see why Miller was so easy to refute. Miller’s 
speculative suture of the problems within a psychoanalytic theory informed by 
structuralism to the foundation problem of modern mathematics leaves out the 
fact that there is “no unconscious in science”. One might easily suggest that 
Miller’s fault was in bringing these two fields together too hastily.  After all, as 
Badiou himself agrees, suture may well account for the relation between the 
unconscious and language although it fails for mathematics and scientific 
discourse in general. Where are the double entendres or slips of the tongue in 
scientific discourse? This may or may not be the case; the point is indeed ir-
relevant for our purposes here. The stakes in this debate are different (if not 
higher). They concern how we are to understand indeterminacy, contingency, 
and rupture within structure. Taking one route, one which we have named the 
“atomistic strategy” and to which I have associated Miller, the indeterminacy or 
the contingency of any given structure is to be derived from a certain gap-to-be-
sutured between a consistent structure and that inconsistent qua indeterminate 
term within the structure to which we designate “abyss” or void. Taking another 
route, that which I have named the “formalist path” and to which I have associ-
ated Badiou as one of its sole protagonists, we understand the indeterminate 
term as a product of the consistent structure itself. Badiou’s insight here entails 
(at least) three philosophical tasks.   
The three points, which I will enumerate below with more care, can be sum-
marized by the use of the Pythagorean legend with which we began. The objec-
tionable nature of the irrational (or incommensurable) root (i.e. √2) was only 
taken as such because of the prior assumption that all (geometrical) proportions 
should be commensurable. This framework allows us to secure the determinate 
borders of rational proportions in precisely the refusal to think through the 
terms of incommensurability on their own terms by throwing it together with 
the inconsistent (hence the name “irrational”). Yet in the positive formalization 
of the irrational, we do not witness the failure of geometry, but only its illusory 
representation (governed by the fiat of the master) according to some policing of 
the normativity of terms (i.e. that all proportions should be rational). The “new” 
form re-inscribes the space of the prior geometry in a larger logical and techni-
cal space and stratifies its determinations against this emergence of the singular 
indeterminate. This is already Euclid’s innovation; banal by now. As such, first-
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ly, the identification of indetermination and inconsistency (or irrationality) is 
merely an effect of the refusal to think the indeterminate on its own terms or, in 
other words, the refusal of its inscription in structure as a new form. Secondly, 
we see that the Pythagorean story is only one in a series of historical develop-
ments where it is clear that new forms are the result of the positive enlargement 
of the formal and the conceptual rather than arising from the supposedly imma-
nent gaps, lacks, or “inconsistencies” in the system. As such the contingency of 
structure is anhypothetical, that is, independent from the inherent dynamics of 
the strata of structural determination. Thirdly, the philosophical task of think-
ing undecidability or incompleteness on their own terms is to render a posi-
tive (thought indeterminate) act whose valence can only be grasped on its own 
grounds rather than the pre-given dynamics of the structure. 
        
Let us look at what is entailed by these three points:
[1] Firstly, the figure of the void is to be separated from the singular inde-
terminate. If the void continues to be associated with the singular indeter-
minate, we continue to assert the co-extensiveness of the indeterminate 
as the necessary “other” of the determinate. This mystification of the void 
is nothing but the ambiguous stand-in for the gaps of structure. Like the 
Epicurean clinamen, a reified indeterminacy is posited only to answer for 
the undetermined origin of the determinate (the nature of atomic inter-
action). Qua indeterminate, the void remains a catch-all placeholder for 
an abyss that signifies the origin-genesis, contingency, rupture, for any 
given system. This reification of the nihil ironically does the opposite, in-
sofar that, although by definition indeterminate and contingent, its char-
acterization remains tied to what is determined and necessitated by the 
gap or gaps of structure. Against this, if the singular indeterminate is to 
have any role at all outside structure, we must pursue an understanding 
of the excessive multiplicity of structure rather than its supposed gaps or 
inconsistency. Like the infinite, the void should be taken as a mundane 
or neutral element of structure: determinate and equal in status with the 
standard terms of structure. In other words, the void qua zero in arithme-
tic is banal insofar as it is the neutral element of arithmetic: the neutral 
element that guarantees iterative generation of terms. The taming of the 
void unlinks it from the indeterminate and allows the latter to play a more 
decisive role in reconceiving any structural rupture.  
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[2] Secondly, with the void thusly separated from the indeterminate sin-
gular, the contingency of structure can be detached from the notion of the 
“virtual” or immanent possibility. This renders structural contingency 
anhypothetical. This may seem incorrect at first, but since the singular 
indeterminate is, within the atomistic strategy, always posited as the am-
bivalent included-excluded term of a structure, it always remained tied 
to the gap of that structure; the “other” of structure. As such the singu-
lar-indeterminate is always an exclusion that relies on the requirements 
of the structure itself; it remains an “other” of that structure. When de-
tached from such a framework, the indeterminate singular, understood 
as the excess of the structure, stands for the non-totalizable nature of 
the structures. This non-totalizability not only undoes any need for a 
question of included-excluded inconsistent term but also designates the 
structural characterization of indeterminacy not as the finitude of struc-
ture (to which a lack or void is co-extensive) but rather the infinitude of 
(any) structure. As such the generalization of the indeterminate across 
structures does not rely on the terms of any particular structure. Again, 
undecidability is a feature of structures taken from the ground-up, not a 
term within an analytics of structure. As such, undecidability qua inde-
terminate is anhypothetical insofar as it does not rely on the analysis of a 
hypothetical or conjectural system. This anhypothetic status also means 
that the singular indeterminate is absolute (or functionally tends towards 
the absolute) insofar as it is not dependent on the constitution of any 
particular structural consistency.
[3] Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, we can grasp the singular 
indeterminate not as irrational or an inconsistency but rather as the in-
scription of a new form. The reason why the indeterminate is understood 
as inconsistency results only from the prior assumption that the determi-
nate organization of structure is founded on a closed circulation of terms. 
This quasi-totalizing representation of structure naturally leads to the 
privileging of the void as its supposed “indeterminate”. By contrast, the 
formalist path, in eschewing such systematic totalization, is nothing less 
than the rejection of such prior assumptions of “completeness”, figura-
tively speaking. As such, the singular is always the inscription of a new 
and positive formalization that, though indeterminate insofar as it has 
no determinate status within the strata of determinations that constitute 
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a structure, is not the failure of the structure but only the failure of the 
representation of the structure as total or complete. 
V. Concluding remarks
The critique carried out above is one that attempts to extend a philosophical 
methodology that places thought under condition of the mathematical revolution 
carried out in the last century. This method is armed with the understanding that 
the conventional linguistic or logical conception of fundamental relations (i.e. 
part-whole, local-global, one-multiple) must undergo significant transformation 
in light of modern mathematics. This methodology can provide important les-
sons in its critique of contemporary thought. This is not because of any historical 
inheritance of the mathesis universalis or more geometrico; the certainty or uni-
vocity of mathematics (under the aegis of judgment). The formalist methodology 
labours under the condition of modern mathematics because of the speculative 
avenues that have been rigorously unfolded for more than a century.
In this examination, I have made use of the early work of Badiou. In tracing the 
first inklings of the formalist path, Badiou provides, in the late 60s, a powerful 
alternative to the significations of the void, then emerging from the Althusse-
rian and Lacanian circles. Although Badiou would heavily revise the theoretical 
armature of this period in his later ontological work of the 80s, what remains 
continuous is his commitment to rejecting the occultation of the void. As such, 
in Badiou’s later attempts to think the rupture of structure, we find him draw-
ing, not from the power of the void, but rather on the constructive process of 
articulating an indeterminate yet self-consistent emergence of novelty, under 
the name of the event. The alternative developed by Badiou, in contrast with 
contemporary thinkers, would be that of a figure of novelty that would not be 
the “other” of structure (void or gap), but rather a generic existence which is 
inscribed through its self-grounding (generic) character. 
We have, in the analysis of the identification of inconsistency and the inde-
terminate, underlined the stakes of the continuing hypostatization of the void 
as the repository of the contingent and the singular. The contending point is a 
rather simple one. With the neutralization of the infinite through the work of 
Cantor and Dedekind, the void is similarly neutralized. In the same stroke, the 
conceptualization of the indeterminate singular falls upon the problem of the 
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excess of structure rather than the indetermination of quantity. The problem is 
no longer that of infinite, or the indefinite abyss of the void, but that of the un-
decidable, or the incompleteness of structure. This formalist “subtraction” from 
the closed circuit of the everything-something-nothing allows us to think the 
indeterminate singular as a self-grounding multiplicity, a radical cut from the 
co-extensiveness of structure and its (supposed) gaps. 
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